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11 Introduction
In this article, we propose a theory of the interaction between intergenera-
tional living arrangements and economic growth. This theory is able to ra-
tionalize in a neoclassical growth model the observed co-movement between
economic growth and the shift from the patriarchal to the nuclear family.
The family structure in Western societies has undergone major changes
since the nineteenth century. In the United States, according to the data
provided by Ruggles (2007), the percentage of elderly whites residing with
their adult children plummeted from almost 70% in 1850, to 13% in 1990.
These ndings are consistent with earlier works like those by Costa (1997),
Michael, Fuchs, and Scott (1980) and Schoeni (1998). Kertzer (1995) dis-
cusses similar ndings for European countries. A recent study from the
United Nations concludes that there is a global trend, across countries and
over time, towards independent forms of living arrangements among older
persons (United Nations (2005)).
Dierent theories have been advanced by sociologists and demographers
to explain this phenomenon. The results of the debate so far has been that
intergenerational coresidence fades away as economic development kicks in.
The role of cultural factors is still disputed. The accepted wisdom is that
they might play a role in in
uencing the rapidity and the intensity of the
process, but do not seem crucial determinants of the process itself (Ruggles
(2009)).1
The recorded shift in the living arrangements from coresidence to non-
coresidence has often been considered by sociologists and demographers as
going together with a change in the social status of the elderly in the society
(Kertzer (1995)).
From the economist's point of view, social status is an elusive concept,
dicult to dene, and even more dicult to quantify. Several variables such
as patriarchal control, relative income, education, health and psychological
conditions can be thought of as proxy for the social status.
According to Ruggles (2007), the decline of intergenerational coresidence
re
ects a decline of patriarchal control. Patriarchal control was widely dif-
fused in pre-modern societies. For instance, senators in the ancient Rome
were the old heads of the noble families of the city, the so called pater fa-
milias. The very word `senator' has the same root as `senex', which means
`old' in Latin. In facts, patriarchal control endured and was still strong in
the modern age. By comparing the legal entitlements of the parents to their
children's income in France, England and the United States since the sev-
1See Kramarov (1995) for a dierent perspective.
2enteenth century, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2010) make a convincing case
for the presence of a de jure high degree of patriarchal control in the West
until as late as the nineteenth century. Thereafter there was a progressive
emancipation of the young generations. Such a feature is a common trait
between the West, China and South Asia, although it has been traditionally
much stronger in the former (Thornton and Fricke (1987)).
More generally, it has been argued by sociologists that the relative status
of the aged, measured as relative income, education, health and psychological
conditions, has diminished as modernization has been taking place (see, for
instance, Cowgill (1974), Palmore and Whittington (1971)).
So, the literature mentioned above points to a change in the family struc-
ture that occurred during, and because of the process of economic develop-
ment, and maintains that such a change went along with, and depended upon
a diminished social status of the elderly.
A peculiarity of the present work is that it is able to account not only for
the observed co-movement between the intergenerational living arrangements
and economic growth, but also also for its connection with the diminished
status of the elderly.
In this article, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model, where
the pattern for coresidence is endogenously determined. Drawing inspiration
from Kotliko and Morris (1988), in Section 2 we build a set up where agents
can decide to either live alone, or coreside with their parents/siblings. The
household is modeled as having a `pluralistic' decision-making (Bergstrom
(1997))  a la Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene (1994). In this
context, the coresidence decision turns out to be a function of the bargaining
power of the young and the old, and is in
uenced by the utility levels that
the young and the old can get by living alone. This implies that living
arrangements are ultimately determined by the relative income of the two
generations. The higher is the relative income of the young with respect to
the old, the less likely coresidence will be.
In this paper, we assume that the human capital of the young is positively
aected by exogenous technological progress. The implicit hypothesis here is
that technical change is age-biased towards the young generation. Such an
hypothesis is justied on the ground of a widespread literature. There are
signicant adoption costs linked to a new technology (Jovanovic and Nyarko
(1996)). The young have more incentive to adopt the new technology, as their
lifespan is longer (Ahituv and Zeira (2001)). Moreover, the old are typically
more skilled at the existent technology, which makes the opportunity costs
of learning the new technology possibly higher for them than for the young
(Chari and Hopenhayn (1991)).
On the other hand, the human capital of the old generation will benet
3from an experience premium of the learning-by-doing type.
These two assumptions imply that the relative income of the young with
respect to the old will depend from the ratio between technological progress
and the experience premium.
According to the theory we develop, coresidence was more frequent in
ancient societies because of the slow technical progress that characterised
those societies. If technical progress is slow, the experience premium of the
learning-by-doing type is relatively more important. The relative income of
the young will be low, and therefore they will gain from coresiding with the
old.
With the industrial revolution rst, and with the extraordinary fast path
of technical progress in the twentieth century, things have changed. The
relative importance of the experience premium has shrunk, while the relative
income of the young has increased. In this new context, the incentives for
intergenerational coresidence may eventually disappear.
One implication of our theory is that the historical shift in living arrange-
ments depended upon the rate of growth of income rather than its level.
While to the best of our knowledge there is not enough direct evidence to
test this hypothesis, the micro data for the United States in Ruggles (2007)
do provide some indirect evidence. In particular, before World War II, cores-
idence was more widespread among the white and the wealthier than among
the black and the poorer. This casts a serious doubt over the idea that higher
income per s e should always go together with more independent living.
Our theory has also an additional implication concerning the social status
of the elderly. Sticking to a narrow denition of social status, dened as the
fraction of resources allocated to each generation, the model can also predict
the progressive deterioration of the social status of the elderly documented
in the sociological literature.2
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3 we rst
illustrate the main mechanisms of the theory in the context of a general
model with exogenous growth.
Under some restrictions on the parameters, in Section 4 we go one step
further by endogenizing the human capital formation. This allows us to study
the feedback eect of living arrangements on the economic performance of a
given society.3 We assume that only the young cares for the human capital
of the child, and devotes a fraction of his time to educate him. The results
conrm the main ndings of Section 3.
2In this article we abstract from the presence of public transfers.
3Duranton, Rodr guez-Pose, and Sandall (2008) give empirical evidence on the impor-
tance of the family structure for determining educational attainment, social capital, labor
participation, sectoral structure, wealth, and inequality.
4An additional advantage of this endogenous growth model is that it al-
lows us to say something about the respective role of economic and cultural
factors in causing the shift from coresidence to non-coresidence. In particu-
lar, when the shift in living arrangements is explained by technical change
(economic factors), the model economy experiences an increase in the growth
rate along a balanced growth path. On the contrary, when the shift in liv-
ing arrangements is explained by changes in the direct taste for coresidence
(cultural factors), the model economy experiences a reduction of the growth
rate along a balanced growth path.
Section 5 draws together the thread of the arguments and concludes.
2 The family structure: benchmark model
The economy is an OLG economy populated by two generations of individuals
living for two periods, the young (`y') and the old (`o').4 The economy
produces one good using the human capital of the young (Hy) and the human
capital of the old (Ho) as inputs. We assume that the two types of human






The human capital of the two generations evolves exogenously according to
a law of motion that we shall specify later.5 The labour supply of each
individual is xed and normalised to 1. The growth rate of the population
is 0.
The nal good is the numeraire.
There is no physical capital and no saving: in each period the young and
the old consume all the available income. As a consequence, the choice of an
agent in one period only depends on the variables which aects the utility
function in that period.6 In what follows we omit time subscript for the sake
of notation.
The young and the old can either live apart or coreside.
4The model presented in this section is a slightly modied version of Kotliko and
Morris (1988).
5This exogeneity assumption will be removed in Section 4.
6This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity, as in Blackburn and Cipriani
(2005).
52.1 The utility function




i + (1   )logx
i +  log
i; (2)
where i = y;o and ci is consumption. The variable xi is a good that can be
either bought by both the young and the old on the market, or, in case of
coresidence, can be shared among the members of the family (for instance,
housing services). The price of x is denoted by p. We assume that x is
produced using a linear technology x = ZY x, where Y x are the units of the
nal good Y used in the production of x. In equilibrium, Z = 1
p.
The parameter  is dummy variable. It takes values  = 0, if agent i lives
alone, and  = 1, if the agents coreside.
The variable i measures the taste for living together. For i = 1, the
individual i draws no direct utility from living together; for i< 1 (> 1)
agents get a negative (positive) direct utility from living in a family.
Therefore, living together has two eects on the utility of the agents: rst,
there is a direct eect (positive or negative) through the taste for family i;
second, there is an indirect (positive) eect through the possibility of sharing
the good x.
2.2 Optimal choices
2.2.1 Optimal choices in the case of non-coresidence






The variable w is the wage in eciency unit. This is equal in equilibrium
to the marginal productivity of labour in eciency unit, which in turn is
constant and equal to 1.










Thus the indirect utility function is:
^ V  ^ U(^ c
i; ^ x
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log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62.2.2 Optimal choices in the case of coresidence
We assume that, in case of coresidence, the young and the old bargain over the
distribution of the resources within the family. We model such a bargaining
using a collective model (Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene
(1994)), that only imposes the requirement that the bargaining process lead
to an ecient solution.
The household maximizes the sum of the utility functions of the young
and the old, weighted by their respective bargaining power:
max~ U(c








where ~ U(ci;x)  U(ci;x;1). Notice that x appears here as a pure public
good.














and the indirect utility functions are:
~ V
y(;
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2.2.3 Optimal choice between coresidence and living alone
The solution to the maximization problem here above gives the allocation
of resources within the family for any value of the bargaining power of the
young, . However, not all the values of  are compatible with the choice of
coresidence. In particular, coresidence can only occur when there exists at
least one value of  such that coresidence is attractive to one of the agents,
7and indierent to the other. In what follows we are going to characterize the
interval of values of  that are compatible with the choice of coresidence.7
We dene min as the value of  such that: ~ V y(;y) = ^ V y. By solving










According to this denition, min is the value of the bargaining power of the
young such that the young is indierent between living alone or with the
old. Notice that, according to equation (11), ~ V y(;y) is increasing in . It
follows that for any  > min, the young prefers coresidence. Notice also that
a value 0  min  1 such that ~ V y(;y) = ^ V y exists if and only if
Hy
Hy + Ho  
y: (14)
If not, the young always decide to live alone. Finally, notice that the condi-
tion (14) always holds for any y > 1.
Similarly, we dene max as the value of  such that: ~ V o(;o) = ^ V o. By
solving the equation we get









Hence, max is the value of the bargaining power of the young such that the
old is indierent between living alone or forming a family with the young.
Since ~ V o(;o) is decreasing in  (equation (12)), the old prefers coresidence
for any  < max. Notice that the condition 0  max  1 is veried if and
only if
Ho
Hy + Ho  
o: (16)
If not, the old always decide to live alone. Notice also that the condition (16)
always holds for any o > 1.
According to these denitions, we can parametrize the possibility of cores-





max < 1 there exists  such that coresidence is advantageous for both
the young and the old. Living alone is inecient: the utility levels that
can be achieved from living alone are inside the utility possibility set
that can be derived in case of coresidence.
7The same procedure is used by Iyigun and Walsh (2007) in the analysis of the bar-
gaining between husbands and wives.
8 if
min
max = 1, both the young and the old are indierent between cores-
idence and living alone. The utility levels that can be achieved from
living alone are on the frontier of the utility possibility set that can be
derived in case of coresidence.
 if
min
max > 1 there is no  such that coresidence is attractive to both the
young and the old. The utility levels that can be achieved from living




































where h  Hy
Ho.
As a consequence, living arrangements will depend on the taste for cores-
idence i, and on the relative income of the young and the old. We can
distinguish four cases.
1. i = 1 for i = y;o. We have
min
max < 1 provided that  < 1. If living
together brings no variation to the utility functions of both the young
and the old, then living together is always Pareto improving, because
of the possibility of sharing the good x. On the other hand if  = 1
then
min
max = 1 and both the young and the old are indierent between
coresidence and living alone.
2. i > 1 for i = y;o. In this case
min
max < 1 always. This case is trivial, as
both the individuals draw utility from living together.
3. i < 1 for i = y;o. We have that
min
max can be S 1 if  < 1. When
both the individuals dislike coresidence, the decision to coreside or not
depends on the distaste for coresidence and on the relative income. In
the limit for i  ! 0,
min
max > 1. If the distaste is maximum for both of
them, then coresidence is obviously suboptimal. Living alone is Pareto
improving if  = 1.
4. y < 1 and o  1, or o < 1 and y  1 . Here the young (the old)
dislikes coresidence, but the old (the young) likes it. In this case, we
have that
min
max can be S 1.
93 Economic development and the family struc-
ture: exogenous growth
In this section, we shall study how technical change aects the family struc-
ture in an exogenous growth model.
We assume that the human capital of the two generations evolves accord-
ing to the following laws of motion
H
y





t = (1 + et)H
y
t 1; (19)
where g is the exogenous growth rate of the young's human capital, and e is an
exogenous experience premium of the learning-by-doing type. Our working
hypothesis is that technological developments determine g while leaving e
unaected. The idea is that technical progress is age-biased towards the
young. This is so for a number of reasons, put to the fore by a recent
widespread literature on vintage capital, technology adoption and diusion.8
In a nutshell, the young has more incentive to forego current production
to learn the new technology, as his time span is longer, and therefore the
discounted reward higher. Moreover, if the technical innovation is a major
one, the experience premium of the old gets eroded soon, and the young,
who will reasonably learn directly the new technology, will end up being
more skilled.9







(1 + gt+1) + (1 + et+1)
(1 + gt) + (1 + et)
(1 + gt): (20)
Along a balanced growth path, g and e ought to be constant. This implies
1 + 
 = 1 + g; (21)
that is, the growth rate of the economy coincides with the growth rate of the
human capital of the young.





8See Ahituv and Zeira (2001), Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Jovanovic and Nyarko
(1996).
9This will be particularly true if the young has higher general education than the old
as opposed to the vocational education of the skill-specic or the learning-by-doing type
(Krueger and Kumar (2004)).
10Such a formulation makes the relative skills between generations an in-
creasing function of the rate of technical progress and a decreasing function
of the experience premium.





























































Figure 1: Numerical example: patterns of min and max as a function of g
for dierent values of i and with  = 0:7. Legend: X axis: g; Y axis: .
To grasp the nal eect of technical change on the coresidence pattern,
we need to study how g aects the ratio
min













































condition is always veried for any o  1.
This simple model is able to predict the observed shift in intergenera-
tional living arrangements. In the model, such a shift may happen for sev-
eral reasons, a change in the attitude towards coresidence embedded in the
parameters i, a change in the experience premium e, a change in technol-
ogy embedded in the parameter g. If for instance i and e are constant and
compatible with the cases 3 and 4 in section 2.2.3, a suitable change in g
is sucient to explain the change in living arrangements, provided that the
world started in coresidence. Notice that in this case, we do not need to refer
to any change in preferences to account for the change in living arrangements:
economic development suces to the scope.
To illustrate the point, in Figure 1, we plot the values of min and max
against g. In this numerical example, for the cases 3 and 4 in section 2.2.3,
when g increases enough, living arrangements shift from coresidence to non-
coresidence. In the other cases, coresidence is always optimal.
4 Economic development and the family struc-
ture: endogenous growth
In the previous section, we studied how economic development aects the
family structure. There, we assumed exogenous growth, thereby ignoring
the feedback eects that the family structure might hold on economic devel-
opment.
In this section, we shall remove this assumption and study an extended
model with endogenous human capital accumulation. This will allow us to
explore the bidirectional link between economic development and the family
structure.
4.1 The model
Agents live for three periods. In the rst period, the agent is a child and
makes no active choice. He lives with the young and accumulates human
capital which is assumed to depend on his parent's choices only.
In the second period, the agent is young and has one child.10 The utility
function is almost identical to that of section 2. The only dierence is that
here we assume that parents have a warm glow motivation for investing in
their child's human capital:
















The young has a time endowment equal to 1. He can either work or
invest in the human capital of his child. We call st the amount of time the







with  > 1.
In the third period, the old has the same preferences as in section 2, but






t;) = (1   )logc
o
t +  logx
o
t +  log
o: (27)
Here we denote the weight given to the public good in the utility function as
.
As in section 3, the human capital of the old evolves in time according to
equation (19).
4.2 Optimal choices in the case of non-coresidence




























The optimal choices are:














Notice that the investment in schooling is constant in the case of non-
coresidence.
For what concerns the old, nothing changes compared to section 2.
134.3 Optimal choices in the case of coresidence
As before, in the case of coresidence, the household maximizes the sum of









































t+1;1), and ~ Uo(co
t;xt)  Uo(co
t;xt;1).
The optimal choices are:






























4.4 Optimal choice between coresidence and living alone
Using the same procedure as in section 2, we compute the threshold values
























In order to have an analytical solution to the dynamics of the model, we have
to assume  = 0. This means that we disregard the role of the public good.
Furthermore, we shall restrict the analysis to the case y < 1 and o > 1.11





The relative human capital of the young is now an endogenous variable,
and is determined by the amount of time that the young invests in schooling.
As st 1 diers depending on whether agents lived together in t 1 or not, we
have two cases. If in t 1 the agents did not live together, then the relevant






does not depend on time. That is, in case of non-coresidence, the relative
human capital is always constant and equal to its balanced growth path level
hnc.
If instead agents did live together in t 1, then the relevant equation for







In this paper, we assume that agents do not leave the possibility of Pareto
improvements unexploited. This means that whenever
min
max < 1, the actual
 always falls within the interval [min, max], and coresidence is chosen. To
be more specic, in the following we shall assume that
 = min + (1   )max; (45)
11As shown in the Appendix, the assumption o > 1 is necessary to have a sustainable
intertemporal equilibrium. Consequently, we assume also y < 1 so as to have the possi-
bility of a shift between coresidence and non-coresidence, as explained in section (2.2.3).
Notice that these assumptions are compatible with the available evidence. Studies of mod-
ern family settings by Aquilino (1990), Ward, Logan, and Spitze (1992) and Whittington
and Peters (1996) show that there is a negative correlation between coresidence and the
children's income, which is compatible with y < 1 in our model. On the other hand, a
recent work by Manacorda and Moretti (2006) shows that there is a positive correlation
between coresidence and the parents' income, which is compatible with o > 1 in our
model.
15with 0 <  < 1 standing for exogenous factors aecting the outcome of the
bargaining process (for instance, the individual ability to bargain).













The balanced-growth-path solution of equation (46) reads
hc =
1
2(1 + e)yof(   1)o (y(   1))+
q
(   1)o[4(1 + e)(o   1)y2(   1) + ((   1)o(y +    y)2)]g > 0(47)
A comparison between hnc and hc - the value of human capital along a
balanced growth path in the case of non-coresidence and coresidence, respec-
tively - reveals that, ceteris paribus, hc > hnc. The rationale of this result lays
in the way in which we have formulated the problem. By assuming  = 0,
we have eliminated the public good from the utility function. This implies
that the only rationale for coresidence in this model is a greater availability
of resources. To say it dierently, young people in this model do coreside if
by doing so they get more resources. As a constant share of those resources
are dedicated to the education of the ospring, it follows that the relative
human capital of the young ought to be higher in case of coresidence.
The overall dynamics of this model is non-trivial. We have two dynamic
rules and two balanced growth paths, depending on whether the agents do or
do not coreside. Moreover, there is in principle room for switching from one
equilibrium to the other. A switching occurs whenever the ratio
min
max goes
from less than one to more than one, and vice versa. As such ratio depends
on h, we can nd the threshold level ^ h such that
min
















For any ht > ^ h, people do not coreside, and the relevant dynamics is that of
equation (43). For any ht < ^ h, people coreside, and the relevant dynamics is
that of equation (46). As we shall make clear in a fortnight, the dynamics of
the model depends on the relative magnitude of ^ h, hnc and hc.











(i) 8  > 1 ) ^ h < hnc < hc, and the economy converges towards hnc.
Non-coresidence is the chosen living arrangement along the balanced growth
path.
(ii) 8  < 2 ) hnc < hc < ^ h, and the economy converges towards hc.
Coresidence is the chosen living arrangement along the balanced growth path.
(iii) 8 2 <  < 1 ) hnc < ^ h < hc, and there is no stable balanced




The dynamics of the relative human capital determines the dynamics of
















(1 + ht)(1 + e)ht 1
1 + ht 1
(51)
Along a balanced growth path, equation (51) reduces to
1 + 
 = (1 + e)h; (52)
where h can take two values, hc or hnc, depending on the living arrangements.
As a consequence, the value of 
 depends on the coresidence status.
4.6 Comparative statics
In this section, we discuss the eects of variations in the parameters of the
model economy on living arrangements, on economic growth, and on (a suit-
able denition of) the social status of the two generations.12
12Notice that in the model there is also room for endogenous changes in the living
arrangements. Take for instance point (i) in Proposition 1. For any initial level of h0 < ^ h,
the economy starts in coresidence, but the dynamics of the model is such that the economy
converges towards the non-coresidence steady state hnc (see Figure 3 in the Appendix).
174.6.1 Family structure and economic growth
We start by studying the eects of a change in  on the family structure. First
notice that  > 1 plays the same role as (1 + g) in section 3. Accordingly, it
can be interpreted as age-biased technical change.
The main eects that changes in  have on the family structure have
already been spelt out in Proposition 1. An increase in  makes coresidence
less likely to appear as a stable equilibrium. It follows that in this model, a
suitable increase in the technical progress is enough to account for a shift in
the living arrangements, from coresidence to non-coresidence.
On the other hand, the following Proposition 2 shows that also suitable


















(i), (ii) and (iii) follow immediately from the computation of the derivatives
of (49), (50). 
When y decreases, the threshold values 2 and 1 decrease: thus for a
given value of , non-coresidence is more likely to appear as a stable living
arrangement. Moreover, since 2 decreases more than 1, the region of values
of  for which a balanced growth path does non exist becomes larger.
By the same token, when o decreases, non-coresidence is more likely to
appear as a stable living arrangement. At the same time, the region of values
of  for which a balanced growth path does non exist shrinks.
Changes in  stands for changes in unspecied idiosyncratic factors af-
fecting the actual bargaining power of the young, . The higher , the lower
. Changes in  does not produce any shift in living arrangements.
So, according to our model there are two possible explanations for the
change in the living arrangement from coresidence to non-coresidence that is
observed across countries and through times. One relies on economic factors
- technical change. One relies on cultural factors - change in the direct taste
for coresidence. As we shall show in following Proposition, only one of the
two explanations, specically that relying on technical progress, is compatible
with the observed pattern of economic growth.
Dene 
nc(;y;o;) the growth rate of output along a balanced growth
path when non-coresidence is the stable living arrangement. Analogously,
18dene 
c(;y;o;) the growth rate of output along a balanced growth path
when coresidence is the stable living arrangement. The following Proposition
3 shows how changes in the structural parameters of the model aect the
growth rate of the economy. We shall distinguish two cases. First, in point
(i) and (ii) we study the eect of marginal changes in the parameters, such
that there is no shift in the chosen living arrangement. Second, in point (iii)
we study the case when the change in the parameters determines a shift in
the living arrangement.
Proposition 3.



















@ < 0. The growth rate of the economy decreases if the actual
bargaining power of the young decreases.









@y = 0. The growth rate of the economy is not aected by




@o = 0. The growth rate of the economy is not aected by




@ = 0. The growth rate of the economy is not aected by
changes in the young's actual bargaining power.
(iii) Shift from coresidence to non-coresidence.
1. Following a change in  from  < 2 to 0 > 1, ) 
nc(0;y;o;) >

c(;y;o;). When the shift in living arrangements is induced by an
increase in technical change, the resulting growth rate of the economy
is higher.
192. Following a change in y from y to y0 < y such the economy shifts





When the shift in living arrangements is induced by a decrease in the
young's taste for coresidence, the resulting growth rate of the economy
is lower.
3. Following a change in o from o to o0 < o such the economy shifts





When the shift in living arrangements is induced by a decrease in the
old's taste for coresidence, the resulting growth rate of the economy is
lower.
Proof
Equation (52) shows that gamma positively depends on h. So, we shall look
at the eects of variations in  and i on h. Computing the derivatives of
(48), (43) and (47), we get the following results: @^ h
@ = 0, @hnc
@ > 0, @hc
@ > 0,
@^ h
@y > 0, @hnc
@y = 0, @hc
@y < 0, @^ h
@o > 0, @hnc
@o = 0, @hc
@o > 0. The points (i) and
(ii) follow immediately. To prove point (iii.1), notice that if the return from
human capital investment increases from a value  below 2 to a value 0
above 1, living arrangements move from coresidence (with hnc < hc < ^ h) to
independent living (with ^ h < hnc0 < hc0). Since hc < ^ h < hnc0, h increases and
so does the balanced growth rate. To prove points (iii.2) and (iii.3), notice
that if i shrinks in such a way that it determines a shift from coresidence
(with hnc < hc < ^ h) to independent living (with ^ h0 < hnc < hc0) ,we are sure
that the growth rate decreases, since hnc is lower than hc. 
The analysis developed so far leads to conclude that, following an increase
in  (the economic explanation), economic growth and independent living
can be positively correlated. In such a scenario coresidence fades away as
economic development kicks in. On the contrary, a decrease in i (the cultural
explanation) can account for the observed shift from coresidence to non-
coresidence only at the price of reducing economic growth.13
13It is straightforward to verify that increases in the experience premium e raise the
threshold values 1 and 2, and reduce the balanced-growth-path values hnc and hc. It
follows that coresidence is more likely to appear for a given . As to the rate of growth
rate of the economy, the eects on 
 of variations in e pass through the bargaining power.
Consequently, variations in the experience premium have no eect on rate of growth of the
economy, if the young and the old live apart. If instead they live together, higher values of
e are associated with lower values of hc: as the old has more bargaining power, the young
will invest less in schooling.
204.6.2 The decline of the pater familias
So far, we have discussed how the structural parameters of the model aect
the coresidence pattern and the growth of the economy. We now turn to the
variations in the social status of the two generations. As we have recalled in
the Introduction, there is evidence in Sociology of a co-movement between
the social status of the elderly and the change in the living arrangements
of the family. From the economists's point of view, however, the concept of
`social status' is rather elusive. In the following, we use a narrow denition of
social status. We dene as social status of each generation i the share of total
resources allocated to it, Hi
Hy+Ho. In case of coresidence, that is for  < 2,
the social status of the young so dened coincides with the bargaining power
, while (1 ) is the social status of the old. When instead non-coresidence
is the equilibrium, that is for  > 1, along a balanced growth path the social
status of the young rewritten in terms of h is hnc
1+hnc, while that of the old is
1   hnc
1+hnc.
We are now going to study under what conditions the social status of
the old as dened here above deteriorates when the economy shifts from
coresidence to non-coresidence. The aim is to verify whether our model is
compatible with the sociological literature mentioned above.14
Proposition 4.
Assume that the economy shifts from coresidence to non-coresidence, follow-
ing a change in  from  < 2 to 0 > 1.








such that, if 0 > 1, then
1    > 1   hnc
1+hnc.
Proof
We are comparing two equilibria, one with coresidence and one with non-
coresidence. We assumed that the shift from one equilibrium to the other is
caused by a change from  < 2 to 0 > 1. In balanced growth path, we can
write the social status of the young living alone as
hnc
1 + hnc =
0(1   )
(1 + e) + 0(1   )
(53)
(see equation (43)). Notice that hnc
1+hncis increasing in 0.
14We limit ourselves to the case in which the shift from coresidence to non-coresidence
is due to technical change.
21To prove Proposition 4 it is enough to prove that:
(i) 1   min > 1   hnc
1+hnc with 1 = 1.
(ii) 1   max > 1   hnc





The meaning of (i) is that, for  = min, if  is only slightly above 1, the
social status of the elderly was higher before the shift from coresidence to
non-coresidence. The meaning of (ii) is the same, but in this case  = max,
and the required change in  is more signicant.
(i) Using equation (40) for h = hc and (47) for  = 1, we got
min =
(1   )
(1 + e)y + (1   )
(54)
The expression for min is increasing in . We evaluated equation (54) for
 = 2, which is the highest value of  compatible with coresidence. By the
same token we evaluated equation (53) for  = 1. Then, we compared the
two expressions. This allows us to single out the minimum value of  such
that min < hnc
1+hnc. It turns out that the latter inequality holds for any  > 1.
(ii) The argument is the same as in point (i), but the relevant expressions are







This proposition shows that, if technical change is big enough, shifts from
coresidence to non-coresidence go along with a deterioration of the social
status of the elderly. We can conclude by saying that, on top of being able
to discriminate between the economic and the cultural explanations of the
observed change in living arrangements, the model presented in this article
is also consistent with the progressive diminution of the elderly stressed by
the sociological literature mentioned in the Introduction.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we provided a theory that is able to account simultaneously
for the observed co-movement between the shift in intergenerational living
arrangements from coresidence to non-coresidence, economic growth and the
diminution in the status of the elderly documented by the literature.
We used a dynamic general equilibrium model of coresidence, where the
decisional set-up of the household is modeled using a collective model of
bargaining.
22The results from our analysis show that, when technical progress is fast
enough, the economy experiences a shift from stagnation to growth, there is
a transition from coresidence to non-coresidence, and the social status of the
elderly tends to deteriorate.
A signicant implication of our theory is that while explanations of the
shift in the living arrangements that are based on pure economic factors are
compatible with a positive co-movement between coresidence and the rate
of economic growth, those relying on cultural factors are not. In particular,
when the shift in living arrangements is explained by technical change (eco-
nomic factors), the model economy experiences an increase in the growth
rate along a balanced growth path. On the contrary, when the shift in liv-
ing arrangements is explained by changes in the direct taste for coresidence
(cultural factors), the model economy experiences a reduction of the growth
rate along a balanced growth path.
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25Appendix
Balanced-growth-path solution to equation (46)
In this section we prove that equation (47) is the balanced-growth-path so-
















Figure 2: Dynamics in case of coresidence. A =
( 1)(y( 1) )
(1+e)y
Figure 2 shows the geometrical representation of equation (46). We re-
strict the parameters values to o > 1, which limits the domain of the function
to the rst and third quadrant. We do so because for o < 1, the dynamics
delivers negative values of h, as can be easily deduced from the graph. This
means that for o < 1 there is no sustainable intertemporal equilibrium.
Equation (46) is a rst order dierence equation, that gives us two values
for the balanced growth path, that we will label hc
1 and hc
2 respectively. As
evident from the graph, hc
2 < 0, meaning that only one of the two steady
states, namely hc
1 > 0, is economically signicant. The positive root of
equation (46) is equation (47).
For hc to be a locally stable equilibrium, it must be that the slope of the
hyperbola crossing the 45 line in hc is less than one in absolute value. Doing




t 1 >  1, for hc
t 1 = hc. It follows
that hc is a locally stable equilibrium. Convergence occurs along a cobweb
pattern. Starting in t = 0 from a very low (high) level of h, h0, the relative
26human capital in period 1, h1, will be very high (low). In period 2, h2 will be
again low (high), yet greater (lower) than h0. By the same token, h3 will be
high (low) but lower (higher) than h1 and so on and so forth. This cyclical
dynamics converges to hc.
The rationale behind the cyclical behaviour of the dynamics is as follows.
For h = h0, the relative human capital of the young is low. Hence, the op-
portunity cost w0H
y
0 of investing in schooling is low compared to the income
enjoyed by the young in coresidence, 0w0(H
y
0 +Ho
0) (see equation (36)). As
a consequence, investment in schooling will be high, implying h1 > h0 (see
equation(42)). By the same token, for h = h1, the relative human capital of
the young is high, resulting in lower investment in schooling. Notice that in
period 2 the economy does not go back to h0 but it stops at h2 > h0. The
reason is that the actual bargaining power of the young  is increasing in
h, meaning that 1 > 0. This means that in period 1 the young is able to
capture a larger share of the family income. As schooling is a normal good,
this income eect partially oset the increase in the opportunity cost.
Proof that hc > hnc










Since we assumed y < 1 and o > 1, the inequality (55) holds 8 2 [0;1].
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of (i)




1  is the value of  such that hnc = ^ h. We know that
hc > hnc. From equations (43) and (47) and (48), we can deduce that both
hc and hnc increase with , while ^ h is invariant with respect to . Therefore,
8  > 1 ) ^ h < hnc < hc.
Figure 3 depicts the dynamics of this case. It represents the rst quadrant
of Figure 2, to which the line for equation (43) was added to represent the
dynamics in the case of non-coresidence. The arrows shows the direction of
the global dynamics.
Let's assume that in period 0, h0 < ^ h. The relevant dynamics is that of
the coresidence case, i.e. the hyperbola. The relative human capital in period
1 will therefore be h1. Now, as h1 > ^ h, the relevant dynamics becomes that
of the non-coresidence case, i.e. the parallel line to the axis of the abscissas
27going through hnc. The relative human capital in period 2 will be h2. Now,
as h2 = hnc > ^ h, the economy will remain in hnc for the following periods.
It is straightforward to show that, if h0 > ^ h, the economy will converge













Figure 3: Dynamics for ^ h < hnc < hc. The economy converges to hnc:
non-coresidence is a globally stable equilibrium.
Proof of (ii)
The value of 2 
(1+e)(o 1)(y)2
( 1)o(y 1) = y1 is the value of  such that hc = ^ h.
By the same argument used in the Proof of (i), 8  < 2 ) hnc < hc < ^ h.
Figure 4 shows the overall dynamics for this case. Starting from h0 < ^ h,
the relevant dynamics is initially that of coresidence (the hyperbola). The
relative human capital in period 1 will be h1. As h1 > ^ h, the relevant
dynamics for the second period becomes that of non-coresidence (the line).
The relative human capital in period 2 will be h2. Now, as h2 < ^ h, the
relevant dynamics will be again that of coresidence. The relative human
capital in period 3 will be h3 < ^ h. Henceforth, coresidence will always be
chosen, until the stable equilibrium hc is reached.
The result would be unaltered if we started from h0 > ^ h. To verify this














Figure 4: Dynamics for hnc < hc < ^ h. The economy converges to hc: coresi-
dence is a globally stable equilibrium.
Proof of (iii)
From the Proof of (i) and (ii), it follows that 8 2 <  < 1 ) hnc < ^ h < hc
Figure 5 shows the dynamics for this case. Starting from h0 < ^ h, the rel-
evant dynamics is initially the hyperbola (coresidence). The relative human
capital in period 1 will be h1. Because h1 > ^ h, the relevant dynamics becomes
now the line (non-coresidence). The relative human capital in period 2 will
be h2. As h2 < ^ h, the relevant dynamics in 2 is again the hyperbola (coresi-
dence), meaning that the economy will move from h2 to h3. As h3 > ^ h, the
relevant dynamics is now the line (non-coresidence), meaning that the econ-
omy will move to h4 = h2. But then, by the same argument, h5 = h3, and
so on and so forth. This means that the economy will oscillate perpetually
between h2 and h3, switching one period from coresidence to non-coresidence
and vice versa the following period. As before, the result does not depend









^ h h0 h1 h2
hnc
t = hnc ^ h
h3
Figure 5: Dynamics for hnc < ^ h < hc. The economy does not converge to
any stable equilibrium and shows coresidence cycles.
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